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Author rschiron
Recipients rschiron
Date 2019-10-24.07:51:17
SpamBayes Score -1.0
Marked as misclassified Yes
Message-id <1571903478.88.0.753943817426.issue38576@roundup.psfhosted.org>
In-reply-to
Content
Copy-pasted from https://bugs.python.org/issue30458#msg347282

================
The commit b7378d77289c911ca6a0c0afaf513879002df7d5 is incomplete: it doesn't seem to check for control characters in the "host" part of the URL, only in the "path" part of the URL. Example:
---
try:
    from urllib import request as urllib_request
except ImportError:
    import urllib2 as urllib_request
import socket
def bug(*args):
    raise Exception(args)
# urlopen() must not call create_connection()
socket.create_connection = bug
urllib_request.urlopen('http://127.0.0.1\r\n\x20hihi\r\n :11211')
---

The URL comes from the first message of this issue:
https://bugs.python.org/issue30458#msg294360

Development branches 2.7 and master produce a similar output:
---
Traceback (most recent call last):
 ...
Exception: (('127.0.0.1\r\n hihi\r\n ', 11211), ..., None)
---

So urllib2/urllib.request actually does a real network connection (DNS query), whereas it should reject control characters in the "host" part of the URL.

***

A second problem comes into the game. Some C libraries like glibc strip the end of the hostname (strip at the first newline character) and so HTTP Header injection is still possible is this case:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1673465

***

According to the RFC 3986, the "host" grammar doesn't allow any control character, it looks like:

   host          = IP-literal / IPv4address / reg-name

   ALPHA (letters)
   DIGIT (decimal digits)
   unreserved    = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." / "_" / "~"
      pct-encoded = "%" HEXDIG HEXDIG
      sub-delims  = "!" / "$" / "&" / "'" / "(" / ")"
                  / "*" / "+" / "," / ";" / "="
   reg-name      = *( unreserved / pct-encoded / sub-delims )

   IP-literal    = "[" ( IPv6address / IPvFuture  ) "]"
   IPvFuture     = "v" 1*HEXDIG "." 1*( unreserved / sub-delims / ":" )
   IPv6address   =                            6( h16 ":" ) ls32
                 /                       "::" 5( h16 ":" ) ls32
                 / [               h16 ] "::" 4( h16 ":" ) ls32
                 / [ *1( h16 ":" ) h16 ] "::" 3( h16 ":" ) ls32
                 / [ *2( h16 ":" ) h16 ] "::" 2( h16 ":" ) ls32
                 / [ *3( h16 ":" ) h16 ] "::"    h16 ":"   ls32
                 / [ *4( h16 ":" ) h16 ] "::"              ls32
                 / [ *5( h16 ":" ) h16 ] "::"              h16
                 / [ *6( h16 ":" ) h16 ] "::"
   h16           = 1*4HEXDIG
   ls32          = ( h16 ":" h16 ) / IPv4address
   IPv4address   = dec-octet "." dec-octet "." dec-octet "." dec-octet
================


CVE-2019-18348 was assigned to this flaw, which is similar to CVE-2019-9947 and CVE-2019-9740 but it is about the *host* part of a url.
History
Date User Action Args
2019-10-24 07:51:18rschironsetrecipients: + rschiron
2019-10-24 07:51:18rschironsetmessageid: <1571903478.88.0.753943817426.issue38576@roundup.psfhosted.org>
2019-10-24 07:51:18rschironlinkissue38576 messages
2019-10-24 07:51:17rschironcreate