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Title: [security] CVE-2019-9674: Zip Bomb vulnerability
Type: security Stage: resolved
Components: Library (Lib) Versions: Python 3.8, Python 3.7, Python 3.6, Python 3.4, Python 3.5
Status: closed Resolution: fixed
Dependencies: Superseder:
Assigned To: Nosy List: 18z, Victor Kung, christian.heimes, jaraco, krnick, serhiy.storchaka, vstinner, xtreak
Priority: normal Keywords: patch

Created on 2019-03-11 07:16 by krnick, last changed 2022-04-11 14:59 by admin. This issue is now closed.

Pull Requests
URL Status Linked Edit
PR 13378 merged krnick, 2019-05-17 07:50
PR 15976 merged miss-islington, 2019-09-11 15:04
Messages (19)
msg337650 - (view) Author: JUN-WEI SONG (krnick) * Date: 2019-03-11 07:16
Dear Python Community, 

We’ve found a vulnerability in cpython Lib and already received a cve number (CVE-2019-9674)

We also have a patch for this vulnerability, please tell us what to do next.
Since we don’t want to uncover the vulnerability before it get fixed.

msg337651 - (view) Author: KunYu Chen (18z) * Date: 2019-03-11 07:19
Dear community,

I am one of the discoverer of this vulnerability, please tell us what to do next :D 

Kunyu Chen
msg337652 - (view) Author: Karthikeyan Singaravelan (xtreak) * (Python committer) Date: 2019-03-11 07:22
You can find the process to report security vulnerabilities at . Please email the details to and who will analyze the report before public disclosure.
msg337835 - (view) Author: KunYu Chen (18z) * Date: 2019-03-13 05:39
Thank you Karthikeyan Singaravelan.
We're working on it :D

Kunyu Chen
msg339061 - (view) Author: Christian Heimes (christian.heimes) * (Python committer) Date: 2019-03-28 16:54
Issue #36462 contains more information. The reporter claims that the zipfile module is inherent insecure because it does not provide any heuristics to make zipbomb attacks harder.

I'm -1 to implement such a heuristic. The zipfile module is a low level module and should not limit extraction by defaykt. Instead we should improve documentation and maybe implement some method that simplifies detection of zipbomb attacks. I'm thinking about a method that returns total count of files, total compressed size and total uncompressed size.
msg339062 - (view) Author: Serhiy Storchaka (serhiy.storchaka) * (Python committer) Date: 2019-03-28 17:05
All these are simple one-liners:

    sum(zi.compress_size for zi in zf.infolist())
    sum(zi.file_size for zi in zf.infolist())
msg339083 - (view) Author: JUN-WEI SONG (krnick) * Date: 2019-03-28 23:46
Thank you python community, these two issues are indeed the same problem.

I also think that it is good to make a related document to reduce such problems.
msg339084 - (view) Author: JUN-WEI SONG (krnick) * Date: 2019-03-28 23:46
Thank you python community, these two issues are indeed the same problem.

I also think that it is good to make a related document to reduce such problems.
msg339087 - (view) Author: KunYu Chen (18z) * Date: 2019-03-29 00:20
Thank you for the responses.

I agree with Christian Heimes.

It's indeed better to improve the documentation rather than directly implement the heuristic.
msg339316 - (view) Author: JUN-WEI SONG (krnick) * Date: 2019-04-02 06:14
Hello Python community,

With Christian Heimes’ suggestion, we manipulate appropriate warning to inform users that they may encounter zip bomb issues when using the zipfile module.

The warning we would like to add in the zipfile documentation is shown below :

   .. warning::

    Never extract files from untrusted sources without prior 
    inspection. It is possible that the file may contain zip bomb 
    issues such as The zip bomb will usually be a small file 
    before decompression, but once it is decompressed, it will 
    exhaust system resources.

You can protect your system by limiting system resources, limiting compression ratio (zip bombs are usually quite high), and checking for nested zip files. 

We are also pleasure to provide a patch to enhance the zipfile module to provide basic information.


Inside the ZipFile class : 

def filecount(self):                                                                                         
    """Return total count of files in the archive."""                                                        
    return len(self.filelist)                                                                                
def total_compressed_size(self):                                                                             
    """Return total compressed size in the archive."""                                                       
    return sum([data.compress_size for data in self.filelist])                                               
def total_uncompressed_size(self):                                                                           
    """Return total uncompressed size in the archive."""                                                     
    return sum([data.file_size for data in self.filelist])
msg339329 - (view) Author: Serhiy Storchaka (serhiy.storchaka) * (Python committer) Date: 2019-04-02 11:09
I am against such trivial methods in ZipFile. Its interface is already complicate. The advantage of Python is that you do not need tons of methods for every possible query -- you can just combine few Python features into a one-line expression.

As for the documentation change, it could be useful to add more general note about possible pitfalls. What happen when interrupt extracting or adding to the archive, what happen when extract into existing tree or overwrite an existing file, what happen when the file system does not support some file names, what happen when extract to case-insensitive file system, what happen when extract encrypted file with wrong password, etc. We do not have to tell the user what he should not do, just to warn about the possible consequences.
msg339406 - (view) Author: Victor Kung (Victor Kung) Date: 2019-04-03 17:52
Hello Python community,

I’m curious why the patch or pitfall prevention in ZipFile
 are not suggested. I have no idea if everyone read documentation in detail. It seems straightforward to add the methods in ZipFile with well documented rather than just warn in documentation. Any comment would be appreciated.

Victor Kung
msg339408 - (view) Author: Christian Heimes (christian.heimes) * (Python committer) Date: 2019-04-03 18:09
The suggested approach is merely a heuristic that reduces the impact of a zipbomb. An attacker can circumvent the heuristic. In best case scenario, the approach just increases the cost factor for a successful DoS. For example an attacker may have to upload 10 larger zip files instead of one smaller zip file to fill up the disk space of a server.

The correct approach is to always verify all data from untrusted sources. It's the 101 of application security.
msg339587 - (view) Author: Victor Kung (Victor Kung) Date: 2019-04-08 02:32
I see. 

@Christian Heimes Thank you for the response.
msg341256 - (view) Author: JUN-WEI SONG (krnick) * Date: 2019-05-02 08:22
Thank you very much for your reply. 

Based on discussions above, consensuses are improving the zipfile documentation. 

And we (JUN-WEI SONG &  KunYu Chen) would like to work on this. 

With opinions of Serhiy Storchaka, Christian Heimes and the ideas we have, possible pitfalls are listed below.

    1. From file itself: 

        Decompression may fail due to an incorrect password, an 
        incorrect CRC checksum, an incorrect PKZIP format, an 
        unsupported compression method, or an unsupported decryption.
    2. File system: 

        Each file system has different limitations such as allowable 
        characters in directory entries, the max length of file name, 
        the max length of path name, the max size of single file, the 
        max number of files, the max number of files in a single 
        directory, etc. Decompression will fail as long as these 
        limitations are exceeded.

     3. Operating system: 

        The lack of memory or disk space would lead to decompression 
        failed (see also Zip Bomb). 

     4. Interrupt: 

        Users should be careful in interrupting the process of 
        decompression, such as control-C or killing the process during 
        decompression, which may result in incomplete decompression of 
        the archive.

    5. Different default behaviors: 

        Users should figure out different default extraction behaviors, 
        such as when extracting into the existing tree, it will 
        overwriting an existing file without asking, or  when in a 
        case-insensitive file system, it keeps only one file when 
        extracting an archive which contains many files that have the 
        same name but different case. 

Please let us know if anything’s missing.
msg342693 - (view) Author: JUN-WEI SONG (krnick) * Date: 2019-05-17 07:59
Dear friends,

We moved a little bit forward to improve the writing. :)
msg351921 - (view) Author: Jason R. Coombs (jaraco) * (Python committer) Date: 2019-09-11 15:04
New changeset 3ba51d587f6897a45301ce9126300c14fcd4eba2 by Jason R. Coombs (JunWei Song) in branch 'master':
bpo-36260: Add pitfalls to zipfile module documentation (#13378)
msg351964 - (view) Author: Jason R. Coombs (jaraco) * (Python committer) Date: 2019-09-11 16:03
New changeset c5a672315dffbc95acc1ca28584ec84ddb56626f by Jason R. Coombs (Miss Islington (bot)) in branch '3.8':
bpo-36260: Add pitfalls to zipfile module documentation (GH-13378) (GH-15976)
msg361673 - (view) Author: STINNER Victor (vstinner) * (Python committer) Date: 2020-02-10 07:59
I marked bpo-39341 as a duplicate of this issue: "[security] zipfile: ZIP Bomb vulnerability, don't check announced uncompressed size".
Date User Action Args
2022-04-11 14:59:12adminsetgithub: 80441
2020-02-10 07:59:41vstinnersetmessages: + msg361673
2020-02-10 07:59:22vstinnerlinkissue39341 superseder
2019-09-11 16:03:21jaracosetnosy: + jaraco
messages: + msg351964
2019-09-11 15:04:49jaracosetstatus: open -> closed
nosy: - jaraco

resolution: remind -> fixed
stage: patch review -> resolved
2019-09-11 15:04:37miss-islingtonsetpull_requests: + pull_request15609
2019-09-11 15:04:14jaracosetnosy: + jaraco
messages: + msg351921
2019-05-17 09:00:53vstinnersettitle: Zip Bomb vulnerability -> [security] CVE-2019-9674: Zip Bomb vulnerability
2019-05-17 07:59:20krnicksetmessages: + msg342693
2019-05-17 07:50:04krnicksetkeywords: + patch
stage: resolved -> patch review
pull_requests: + pull_request13288
2019-05-02 13:06:15vstinnersettitle: Cpython/Lib vulnerability found and request a patch submission -> Zip Bomb vulnerability
2019-05-02 08:22:05krnicksetmessages: + msg341256
2019-04-08 02:32:47Victor Kungsetmessages: + msg339587
2019-04-03 18:09:44christian.heimessetmessages: + msg339408
2019-04-03 17:52:22Victor Kungsetnosy: + Victor Kung
messages: + msg339406
2019-04-02 11:09:02serhiy.storchakasetmessages: + msg339329
2019-04-02 06:14:37krnicksetstatus: closed -> open
resolution: remind
messages: + msg339316
2019-03-29 00:20:5718zsetmessages: + msg339087
2019-03-28 23:46:36krnicksetstatus: closed

messages: + msg339084
stage: resolved
2019-03-28 23:46:13krnicksetstatus: open -> (no value)

messages: + msg339083
2019-03-28 17:05:32serhiy.storchakasetnosy: + serhiy.storchaka
messages: + msg339062
2019-03-28 16:54:47christian.heimessetnosy: + christian.heimes
messages: + msg339061
2019-03-28 16:43:08brett.cannonlinkissue36462 superseder
2019-03-13 05:39:0818zsetmessages: + msg337835
2019-03-11 09:17:13vstinnersetnosy: + vstinner
2019-03-11 07:22:30xtreaksetnosy: + xtreak
messages: + msg337652
2019-03-11 07:19:4118zsetnosy: + 18z
messages: + msg337651
2019-03-11 07:16:58krnickcreate